When building a Sui Move contract, the first question is what its type system and verifier guarantee—and which safety properties still need explicit checks. An article published on November 13, 2026, at 15:03 (UTC+8) uses Certora Sui Prover to examine that boundary.
The article identifies five gaps to check: bits lost during a shift, signed values stored in unsigned integers, privileged functions without caller checks, unchecked object ownership, and older package versions that remain callable. It discusses vulnerabilities involving Cetus, Aftermath Finance, Typus Finance and Scallop, then describes verifiable Certora rules labeled P1–P4 and broader protocol invariants labeled P5–P8.
Its practical guidance is to test these properties with test_scenario and Sui Prover—but first state the properties and assumptions the verification depends on. The article’s point is not that formal verification automatically makes a contract safe: it can check the properties a builder has specified.
Source: learnblockchain.cn (originally published 2026-11-13 15:03 UTC+8)

