Polygon PoS fork proposal would reassign 70.49 million POL from frozen addresses

For builders, the question in a proposed Polygon PoS hard fork is what a chain can do to a balance without its holder’s signature. Polymarket and Binance proposed a one-time change that would set balances in five addresses identified as attacker-controlled to zero and credit the same amount—about 70.49 million POL—to recovery addresses they designate. The proposal would leave POL’s total supply unchanged. It was a proposal, not an enacted change, when originally reported on November 5, 2026, at 21:00 Beijing time.

The proposal followed two October 30 security incidents. The report says Polymarket’s frontend and a Binance hot wallet were compromised, and Polygon validators froze four addresses linked to the Polymarket incident holding 23.86 million POL and one linked to the Binance incident holding 46.63 million POL. Freezing those addresses prevented transfers; it did not return the assets. According to the proposal, Polymarket received no response when it sought the attacker’s cooperation. The proposal also alleged that the attacker contacted validators and offered cash in exchange for unfreezing addresses.

A freeze restricts what an address can do with its existing balance. The proposed fork would go further: it would alter the chain’s recorded balances without a transaction signed by the keys controlling those addresses. That distinction makes the proposal a governance and protocol-design question, not simply another way to block a transfer. Polymarket and Binance said the change should apply only to the specified addresses and should not establish a general recovery mechanism.

At the time of publication, the Polymarket and Binance teams were due to present their case at a Polygon protocol governance meeting at 22:30 Beijing time on November 5. The report said Polygon officials, relevant governance participants and core developers had not publicly taken a position. It did not establish whether the fork would be approved or implemented. The report gave two approximate dollar values for the POL at issue—$6.7 million and, later, $6.5 million—and said both companies had already fully compensated affected users.

The report compared the proposal with two earlier interventions. Following the 2016 exploitation of The DAO, Ethereum adopted a hard fork that moved funds into a refund contract; opposition to that decision continued on the chain that became Ethereum Classic. More recently, Core Network announced on November 2 that a hard fork had recovered 68,146,177.22 CORE from three attacker-controlled addresses after an October 31 incident involving approximately 97 million CORE staked through b14g. Those examples show that balance-changing forks have occurred elsewhere. They do not establish what Polygon would decide in this case.

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